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WHY ARKANSAS ACT 710 WAS UPHELD, AND
WILL BE AGAIN
Mark Goldfeder*
I. INTRODUCTION
A lie can travel halfway around the world while the truth is
putting on its shoes.
— ironically, not Mark Twain
The recent Eighth Circuit ruling in Arkansas Times LP v.
Waldrip1, the lawsuit revolving around an Arkansas antidiscrimination bill, has led to a lot of (at best) confusion or (at
worst) purposeful obfuscation by people unwilling or unable to
differentiate between procedural issues and the constitutional
merits of a case.2 In other words, reports of the bill’s death have
been very much exaggerated.3
Despite the fact that the court’s narrow ruling did not even
strike down the bill in Arkansas, let alone set a precedent for other
similar bills, there are those who are concerned that the Arkansas
Times decision somehow calls into question legislative action in

* Dr. Mark Goldfeder, Esq. is the Director of the National Jewish Advocacy Center, a
Member of the United States Holocaust Memorial Council, counsel for Hillels of Georgia,
and a contributor at the MirYam Institute. He also served as the founding Editor of the
Cambridge University Press Series on Law and Judaism. The author wishes to thank
Danielle Park, Miles Terry, Marc Greendorfer, and Gadi Dotz for their reviews and
assistance, and a special thanks to Sasha Volokh for his ever-helpful critiques.
1. 988 F.3d 453 (8th Cir. 2021), reh’g en banc granted, opinion vacated (8th Cir. June
10, 2021) (No. 19-01378).
2. See e.g., Elliot Setzer, Eighth Circuit Strikes Down Arkansas’s Anti-BDS Law,
LAWFARE (Mar. 1, 2021), [https://perma.cc/36TX-HAAU] (falsely claiming that the Eighth
Circuit struck down the bill, when in fact all it did was remand the case for further
proceedings).
3. See Sean Savage, Advocates See Federal Court Decision on Arkansas Anti-BDS Law
‘Disappointment,’ Not Setback, JEWISH NEWS SYNDICATE (Feb. 16, 2021),
[https://perma.cc/C8BW-CSWP].
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other states across the country.4 In order to separate fact from
fiction and clarify the constitutional concerns that are still very
relevant in a case that is still very much alive, this Article will
recap what has already actually happened and why, explain what
is still being decided, and then forecast what is likely to happen
in the future of this case.
II. BACKGROUND
“In 2017, Arkansas enacted Arkansas Act 710, titled ‘An Act
to Prohibit Public Entities from Contracting with and Investing in
Companies That Boycott Israel; and for Other Purposes.’”5 Under
this law, state entities are prohibited from contracting on ordinary
terms with companies that boycott the State of Israel.6
The majority of states in the United States of America (thirty
as of the date of this writing) have adopted similar bills, and the
motivation behind them was the rise of the antisemitic Boycott,
Divestment, and Sanctions (“BDS”) Movement, which “operates
as a coordinated, sophisticated effort to disrupt the economic and
financial stability of the state of Israel,”7 persons conducting
business in and with Israel,8 and individuals that the movement
deems to be too closely affiliated with Israel in some way.9
It is the longstanding policy of the United States to oppose
discriminatory boycotts against Israel; ever since President Carter
4. See e.g., Aaron Terr, Eighth Circuit: Arkansas Anti-BDS Law Violates First
Amendment, FIRE: NEWSDESK (Feb. 18, 2021), [https://perma.cc/AW27-6UWM].
5. Ark. Times LP, 988 F.3d at 458; see also ARK. CODE ANN. § 25-1-503 (2017).
6. § 25-1-503(a).
7. See OMAR BARGHOUTI, BDS: BOYCOTT, DIVESTMENT, SANCTIONS: THE GLOBAL
STRUGGLE FOR PALESTINIAN RIGHTS 223 (2011); see also Bob Unruh, Hate-Israel
Movement Flames Out as Investments Rise, WORLD NOT DAILY (June 4, 2016),
[https://perma.cc/4N26-TXQX].
8. GHADA AGEEL, APARTHEID IN PALESTINE: HARD LAWS AND HARDER
EXPERIENCES 100 (Joanne Muzak ed., 2016).
9. As long as those people do not also make useful things that the boycotters want, like
Covid-19 vaccines. Marcy Oster, BDS Founder: Israel-Invented Virus Vaccine Would Be
OK for Boycotters to Use, TIMES ISR. (Apr. 7, 2020), [https://perma.cc/3U9V-PPBN]; see
also Karl Vick, This Is Why It’s Hard to Boycott Israel, TIME (June 5, 2015),
[https://perma.cc/D94K-KJAR] (discussing how the Israel-boycott-movement began with a
targeted boycott of items produced on the West Bank, but the BDS movement has expanded
to a boycott of all things produced in Israel); Boycott Israel Products, BOYCOTT ISR. TODAY
(Sept. 8, 2014), [https://perma.cc/39N3-R7WD] (advocating for a boycott of Israeli and
Jewish products that support Israel directly or indirectly no matter where produced).
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signed the anti-boycott amendments to the Export Administration
Act in 1977,10 every single Congress and administration has
affirmed it.11 All that Arkansas Act 710 and the rest of the socalled anti-BDS bills really do is implement that federal policy by
saying that if you want a particular state to do business with you,
you need to abide by that state’s policies (reflective of federal
policies) related to sound and fair business practices. This
includes a requirement to abide by the state’s anti-discrimination
rules.
In theory this should not be controversial. “The Supreme
Court has consistently found that state and federal antidiscrimination laws that relate to race, religion, color, and
national origin do not violate the highest level of First
Amendment protections.”12 States “all have a compelling interest
in preventing invidious discrimination,” and they are free to
implement “that compelling interest by imposing conduct-based

10. Statement by President Carter upon the Signing of Anti-Boycott Legislation, ISR.
MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFS., [https://perma.cc/2PDQ-DD2X] (last visited Oct. 21, 2017)
[hereinafter President Carter Anti-Boycott Signing Statement].
11. See Marc A. Greendorfer, The BDS Movement: That Which We Call a Foreign
Boycott, by Any Other Name, Is Still Illegal, 22 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 1, 47–48 (2017)
(“Though the EAA Anti-Boycott Law has statutorily lapsed by its own terms pursuant to its
sunset provision, as the Congressional Research Service Report states, ‘its provisions are
continued under the authorization granted to the President in the National Emergencies Act
and the International Economic Emergency Powers Act, most recently under Executive
Order 13222 signed August 17, 2001.’”) (quoting MARTIN A. WEISS, CONG. RSCH. SERV.,
RL33961, ARAB LEAGUE BOYCOTT OF ISRAEL 6 n.18 (2017)). President Carter’s signing
statement itself was quite telling:
For many months I have spoken strongly on the need for legislation to outlaw
secondary and tertiary boycotts and discrimination against American
businessmen on religious or national grounds . . . . My concern about foreign
boycotts stemmed, of course, from our special relationship with Israel, as well
as from the economic, military and security needs of both our countries. But
the issue also goes to the very heart of free trade among all nations . . . . The
bill seeks instead to end the divisive effects on American life of foreign boycott
[sic] aimed at Jewish members of our society. If we allow such a precedent to
become established, we open the door to similar action against any ethnic,
religious, or racial group in America.
President Carter Anti-Boycott Signing Statement, supra note 10.
12. Marc A. Greendorfer, Boycotting the Boycotters: Turnabout is Fair Play Under
the Commerce Clause and the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine, 40 CAMPBELL L. REV.
29, 61 & n.135 (2018) (first citing Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int’l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481
U.S. 537, 549 (1987); then citing Holder v. Humanitarian L. Project, 561 U.S. 1, 39 (2015);
and then citing Christian Legal Soc’y v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661, 697-98 (2010)).
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regulations on government contractors.”13 In fact, liberal
organizations like the American Civil Liberties Union (“ACLU”)
have been publicly supportive of this idea on a regular basis and
in a variety of contexts.14 The only difference here appears to be
the relative popularity of the targets of the discriminatory action
that the government is seeking to protect against. In this case (as
applied), more often than not the people being discriminated
against are Jewish people and those who support the Jewish
state.15 “Act 710’s text makes clear the Arkansas General
Assembly’s antidiscrimination goals. As [the legislature] found,
boycotts of Israel, which are ‘discriminatory decisions,’ are
rooted in animus towards ‘the Jewish people.’”16
13. Brief of States of Arizona & Florida et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner,
Ark. Times LP v. Waldrip, 988 F.3d 453 (8th Cir. 2021) (No. 19-1378), 2019 WL 2526871,
at *1.
14. See e.g., Heather L. Weaver & Daniel Mach, A New String of State Bills Could
Give Religious Organizations Blanket Immunity from Any Wrongdoing, ACLU: NEWS &
COMMENT. (Mar. 20, 2021), [https://perma.cc/2J63-563P] (arguing that states should be free
to decide whom they contract with, otherwise the law could “make the government an
accomplice to discrimination. For example, the bills could prohibit the State from denying
State contracts, licenses, and certifications, as well as tax exemptions based on religious
organizations’ exercise of their faiths. Under these provisions, the State could be required
to give government contracts to groups like the KKK, which claim to be religiously based,
or organizations that claim a religious right to discriminate against certain social-services
beneficiaries.”).
15. See David Bernstein, The ACLU’s Shameful Role in Promoting Antisemitism,
REASON (Mar. 11, 2019), [https://perma.cc/6P26-79TX] (noting how, when it comes to the
BDS movement, the ACLU is surprisingly willing to engage in some light antisemitism,
including the use of classic antisemitic tropes, like calling the anti-discrimination provisions
“loyalty oath[s]” to the State of Israel). In his words:
This is complete nonsense. Contractors certifying that their businesses don’t
boycott Israel-related entities is no more a “loyalty oath” to Israel than
certifying that they don’t refuse to deal with black or gay or women-owned
business, or or [sic] that they will deal only with unionized businesses, is a
“loyalty oath” to blacks, gays, women, or unions. Contractors who sign antiboycott certifications are free to boycott Israel and related entities in their
personal lives, and they and their businesses are free to donate to anti-Israel
candidates and causes, and even to publicly advocate for BDS.
Id.
16. Brief of Defendants-Appellees, Ark. Times LP v. Waldrip, 988 F.3d 453 (8th Cir.
2021) (No. 19-1378), 2019 WL 2407954, at *2; see also ARK. CODE ANN. § 25-1-501(2)(3) (2017) (noting that discriminatory boycotts of Israel predated even its official declaration
of independence). Other states have been even more explicit on the subject. See, e.g.,
Greendorfer, supra note 12, at 46 (citing Act of Sept. 24, 2016, §§ 1(f), (j), 2016 Cal. Stat.
4023, 4025 (West 2016) (codified at CAL. PUB. CONT. CODE § 2010 historical and statutory
notes)).

1 GOLDFEDER.MAN.FIN COPY.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2022

2/11/22 3:21 PM

WHY ARKANSAS ACT 710 WAS UPHELD

611

To be clear, while it is not the case that all BDS supporters
are antisemitic, the movement itself is demonstrably so, and that
is the relevant fact for a constitutional analysis.17 The BDS
campaign “is predicated on the claim that Israel is nothing more
than a colonial and racist initiative undertaken by Jews and
explicitly states that the State of Israel is a racist, illegitimate
entity that should not exist.”18 Its leaders openly and repeatedly
deny the Jewish people’s right to self-determination and call for
the destruction of their homeland.19 Per the internationally
recognized International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance
(“IHRA”) definition of antisemitism, that alone is unacceptable
antisemitism,20 but it is also true that the nonprofit umbrella group
for U.S.-based BDS organizations funnels money to terrorist
organizations that specialize in killing Jews and that call for
Jewish genocide;21 that more than thirty22 of the BDS National
Committee’s leaders are actual violent terrorists;23 and that the

17. Greendorfer, supra note 12, at 33.
18. Marc A. Greendorfer, Discrimination as a Business Policy: The Misuse and Abuse
of Corporate Social Responsibility Programs, 8 AM. U. BUS. L. REV. 307, 358 (2020) (citing
GRASSROOTS PALESTINIAN ANTI-APARTHEID WALL CAMPAIGN, TOWARDS A GLOBAL
MOVEMENT: A FRAMEWORK FOR TODAY’S ANTI-APARTHEID ACTIVISM, (2007),
[https://perma.cc/TCT5-LQNV] [hereinafter TOWARDS A GLOBAL MOVEMENT]). In
relation to the colonialist claim, Greendorfer also notes the fact that this is a complete
inversion of history: Jews are the indigenous people of the land and are simply reclaiming
their historic homeland and asserting their inherent right to self-determination. Greendorfer,
supra note 11, at 5, 85.
19. See, e.g., Ali Abunimah, Finkelstein, BDS and the Destruction of Israel, AL
JAZEERA (Feb. 28, 2012), [https://perma.cc/TX4R-8AA4] (quoting an interview with
Norman Finkelstein); Rachel Avraham, Goal of the BDS Movement: Delegitimize Israel,
UNITED WITH ISR. (July 10, 2013), [https://perma.cc/M4HY-L4UP]; HAROLD BRACKMAN,
SIMON WIESENTHAL CTR., BOYCOTT DIVESTMENT SANCTIONS (BDS) AGAINST ISRAEL:
AN ANTI-SEMITIC, ANTI-PEACE POISON PILL 1-3 (2013).
20. See Ahmed Shaheed, Elimination of All Forms of Religious Intolerance, ¶¶ 18, 50,
U.N. Doc. A/74/358 (Sept. 20, 2019) (noting with concern the claim “that the objectives,
activities and effects of the Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions movement are fundamentally
antisemitic” under the IHRA’s internationally accepted standard definition of antisemitism).
21. Armin Rosen & Liel Leibovitz, BDS Umbrella Group Linked to Palestinian
Terrorist Organizations, TABLET (June 1, 2018), [https://perma.cc/P3WK-8H52].
22. Terrorists in Suits: The Ties Between NGOs Promoting BDS and Terrorist
Organizations, STATE OF ISR. (Feb. 2019), [https://perma.cc/Z4U7-D6PW] (detailing
exposed information of more than thirty individuals who are BDS leaders and have personal
involvement in actual terrorism).
23. Emily Jones, ‘Terrorists in Suits’: Senior Leaders of Anti-Israel BDS Groups Tied
to Palestinian Terror, CBN NEWS (Feb. 4, 2019), [https://perma.cc/9QNN-TMA6].
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antisemitism some BDS activists spout24 often breaks through the
“non-violent” veil,25 leading to people, including innocent Jewish
(not Israeli) American citizens getting hurt.26 Our government is,
of course, aware of these connections; in 2016 for example,
Congress heard testimony from former United States Department
of the Treasury counterterrorism analyst Dr. Jonathan Schanzer
that: “[i]n the case of three organizations that were designated,
shut down, or held civilly liable for providing material support to
the terrorist organization Hamas, a significant contingent of their
former leadership appears to have pivoted to leadership positions
within the American BDS campaign.”27
This is also not in any way a partisan issue: both the
Republican and Democratic parties have consistently denounced
BDS in their platforms.28 Nor is it only a federal issue; in 2017,
the governors of all fifty states signed onto a statement affirming
24. Jeremy Bauer-Wolf, After Threat of Violence, Calls to Fire RA, INSIDE HIGHER ED
(Aug. 1, 2018), [https://perma.cc/6L42-F2VG] (stating that a college student who was
associated with a student organization which supports BDS sought to physically fight
Zionists on campus).
25. Rachel Frommer, British Jewish Leaders Outraged by London University AntiIsrael Protest Which Required Police Intervention, ALGEMEINER (Oct. 28, 2016, 4:37 PM),
[https://perma.cc/JNH2-T3UD].
26. DAN DIKER & JAMIE BERK, JERUSALEM CTR. FOR PUB. AFFS., STUDENTS FOR
JUSTICE IN PALESTINE UNMASKED: TERROR LINKS, VIOLENCE, BIGOTRY, AND
INTIMIDATION ON US CAMPUSES 5, 28 (2018), [https://perma.cc/6NYS-TSLK].
27. Israel Imperiled: Threats to the Jewish State: Joint Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, & Trade & the Subcomm. on the Middle E. & N. Afr. of the
H. Comm. on Foreign Affs., 114th Cong. 23 (2016) (statement of Dr. Jonathan Schanzer,
Vice President of Rsch., Found. for Def. of Democracies); see also Israel, the Palestinians,
& the United Nations: Challenges for the New Admin.: Joint Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on the Middle E. & N. Afr. and the Subcomm. on Afr., Glob. Health, Glob. Hum. Rts., & Int’l
Orgs. of the H. Comm. on Foreign Affs., 115th Cong. 42-43 (2017) (statement of Dr.
Johnathon Schanzer, Vice President of Rsch., Found. For Def. of Democracies):
[The Palestinian National Fund] reportedly pays the salaries of the [Palestine
Liberation Organization’s (“PLO”)] members, as well as students, who
received tens of millions of dollars in support of BDS activities each year . . .
. PLO operatives in Washington, DC are reportedly involved in coordinating
the activities of Palestinian students in the U.S. who receive funds from the
PLO to engage in BDS activism. This, of course, suggests that the BDS
movement is not a grassroots activist movement, but rather one that is heavily
influenced by PLO-sponsored persons.
28. See, e.g., Republican Platform 2016, GOP (2016), [https://perma.cc/U9AEDNKA]; 2016 Democratic Party Platform, AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT (2016),
[https://perma.cc/S6Z8-Q6YE]; 2020 Democratic Party Platform, DEMOCRATIC NAT’L
CONVENTION (August 18, 2020), [https://perma.cc/S7VL-MB9S].

1 GOLDFEDER.MAN.FIN COPY.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2022

2/11/22 3:21 PM

WHY ARKANSAS ACT 710 WAS UPHELD

613

their opposition to BDS, noting that “[t]he goals of the BDS
movement are antithetical to our values and the values of our
respective states[,]” and reiterating that BDS’s “single-minded
focus on the Jewish State raises serious questions about its
motivations and intentions.”29
And so, it is not surprising that, in response to the BDS
movement, a majority of states have enacted their own “anti-BDS
bills,”30 which mirror the federal anti-boycott provisions and seek
to prevent American citizens and businesses from being forced to
take sides in a foreign conflict, and to take part in actions (such as
national origin discrimination) which are repugnant to American
values and traditions.31
Just so that there is no confusion: none of the state “antiBDS” laws ban or punish speech that is critical of Israel; none of
the state laws target advocacy for Palestinian rights; and none of
the state laws stop anyone or any business from boycotting Israel.
The laws simply say that if you do choose to boycott Israel in a
discriminatory manner, the State can choose not to do business
with you.
Again, there should be nothing controversial with a state
simply choosing how to spend its dollars.32 Government
29. Governors United Against BDS, AM. JEWISH COMM., [https://perma.cc/M9MX98QY] (last visited Oct. 1, 2021).
30. Some of which are modeled in spirit after the 1977 amendments to the Export
Administration Act. See, e.g., Export Administration Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 9552, 91 Stat. 235 [hereinafter EAA of 1977]; Impact of the Boycott, Divestment, & Sanctions
Movement: Hearing Before the Subcomm. On Nat’l Sec. of the H. Comm. on Oversight and
Gov’t Reform, 114th Cong. (2015) (statement of Eugene Kontorovich); Ribicoff Amendment
to the Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1520 (codified as amended at
26 U.S.C. § 999); Anti-Semitism: State Anti-BDS Legislation, JEWISH VIRTUAL LIBR.,
[https://perma.cc/H9HJ-NWNS] (last visited Nov. 25, 2021).
31. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241, 243 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(a)).
32. This is usually not a disputed point, and it applies in a variety of areas. For
example, there is a market participant exception to the Commerce Clause that allows a state
to make commercial purchasing decisions to comport with the interests of the state, even if
that decision may otherwise appear to be partisan in some way. See Reeves, Inc. v. Stake,
447 U.S. 429, 437-39 (1980). While Act 710 is not a Commerce Clause case, the market
participant exception certainly reinforces the idea that states are not always prohibited from
acting in their own interests when it comes to commercial relations. If this were not the case,
then states like California would not be allowed to do what they do when acting as a market
participant for state-sponsored travel by state employees, i.e., prohibiting travel to states or
localities that have policies or laws that California’s legislators find to be discriminatory,
such as states that refuse to fully support LGBTQ activism. See Rebecca Beitsch, Supposedly
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spending (especially with accompanying legislative findings) in
this context is government speech, and “as a general matter, when
the government speaks it is entitled to promote a program, to
espouse a policy, or to take a position. In doing so, it represents
its citizens and it carries out its duties on their behalf.”33 In fact,
the Supreme Court has continually refused “[t]o hold that the
Government unconstitutionally discriminates on the basis of
viewpoint when it chooses to fund a program dedicated to
advance certain permissible goals, because the program in
advancing those goals necessarily discourages alternative
goals.”34 In the case of Arkansas Act 710 and all similar statutes,
the government does not even seek to fund a controversial
program, it merely seeks not to fund a program that
discriminates.35 While people remain free to engage in hateful
actions, that does not make them less hateful, nor does it mean
that the State must agree to subsidize those actions.36 “To argue
otherwise would be to suggest that [a] state is constitutionally
obligated to support the BDS [M]ovement, which is not only
irrational but also has no basis in law.”37
In addition to protecting citizens from coercion and
protecting the government from involving itself in discriminatory
Symbolic, State Travel Bans Have Real Bite, PEW (Aug. 15, 2017), [https://perma.cc/C34V8GE6] (detailing the negative economic impact imposed on some states by six other states,
including California, by utilizing the market participant exception to further their interests).
Of course, in that case the ACLU (which filed against Act 710 here) openly supported the
choice that California made not to engage with those whom they consider to be acting in a
discriminatory fashion. See Carma Hassan, California Adds 4 States to Travel Ban for Laws
It Says Discriminate against LGBTQ Community, CABLE NEWS NETWORK (June 23, 2017,
5:50 PM), [https://perma.cc/KZL5-E6FH].
33. Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 576 U.S. 200, 208 (2015);
see also Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 481 (2009) (holding that a city’s
decision to reject, or accept, certain monuments is a form of government speech).
34. Walker, 576 U.S. at 208 (quoting Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 194 (1991)).
35. See Mark Goldfeder, Stop Defending Discrimination: Anti-Boycott, Divestment,
and Sanctions Statutes Are Fully Constitutional, 50 TEX. TECH L. REV. 207, 219 (2018).
36. See, e.g., Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 78 (1984) (“[I]nvidious private
discrimination may be characterized as a form of exercising freedom of association protected
by the First Amendment, but it has never been accorded affirmative constitutional
protections.”) (emphasis added) (quoting Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 470
(1973)); N.Y. State Club Ass’n, Inc. v. City of N.Y., 487 U.S. 1, 13 (1988); Bd. of Dirs. of
Rotary Int’l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 549 (1987); Ark. Times LP v. Waldrip,
988 F.3d 453, 467 (8th Cir. 2021).
37. Andrew Cuomo, If You Boycott Israel, New York State Will Boycott You, WASH.
POST (June 10, 2016), [https://perma.cc/727P-CW9X].
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practices, anti-BDS bills also protect the economic interests of the
United States, which could be detrimentally impacted by efforts
to disrupt the economic stability of a close ally,38 as well the
interests of each of the individual states themselves. Arkansas,
for example, does almost $43,000,000 a year worth of trade with
Israel,39 and has longstanding binational foundation grants that it
shares with Israel in the areas of Agricultural Research and
Development; Science and Technology; and Industrial Research
and Development.40 And so aside from the fact that supporting
BDS is morally wrong, supporting those who would boycott
Israel is also a bad business decision for the United States of
America, and leading politicians of both major political parties
have consistently affirmed this.41
As it relates to this point, on February 24, 2016, President
Barack Obama signed the Trade Facilitation and Trade
Enforcement Act of 2015 into law.42 The Act promotes United
States–Israel relations by discouraging cooperation with entities
that participate in boycott, divestment, and sanctions movements
against Israel, and requires regular reporting on such entities.43
As the President explained, in no uncertain terms, “I have directed
my administration to strongly oppose boycotts, divestment
campaigns, and sanctions targeting the State of Israel.”44 Several
provisions in the Act bear repeating—for example, the
“[s]tatements of policy,” say that Congress:
(1) supports the strengthening of economic cooperation
between the United States and Israel and recognizes the
tremendous strategic, economic, and technological value of
cooperation with Israel;
....

38. Michael Eisenstadt & David Pollock, Friends with Benefits: Why the U.S.-Israeli
Alliance Is Good for America, WASH. INST. (Nov. 7, 2012), [https://perma.cc/7NV4-JKB5].
39. State-to-State Cooperation: Arkansas and Israel, JEWISH VIRTUAL LIBR.,
[https://perma.cc/DJT9-6CSE] (last visited Mar. 20, 2021).
40. Id.
41. See Goldfeder, supra note 35, at 210–12.
42. Trade Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-125, 130
Stat. 127 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. §§ 4301-4456 (2016)).
43. 19 U.S.C. § 4452(a)-(b), (d).
44. Statement on Signing the Trade Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act of 2015,
2016 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 98 (Feb. 24, 2016).
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(4) opposes politically motivated actions that penalize or
otherwise limit commercial relations specifically with Israel,
such as boycotts of, divestment from, or sanctions against
Israel[.]45

Based on these and other similar (and consistent)
Congressional findings over the decades,46 the Arkansas
legislature found in the passing of Act 710 that:
(4) It is the public policy of the United States, as enshrined
in several federal acts, to oppose boycotts against Israel, and
. . . Congress has concluded as a matter of national trade
policy that cooperation with Israel materially benefits
United States companies and improves American
competitiveness;
(5) Israel in particular is known for its dynamic and
innovative approach in many business sectors, and therefore
a company’s decision to discriminate against Israel, Israeli
entities, or entities that do business with or in Israel, is an
unsound business practice, making the company an unduly
risky contracting partner or vehicle for investment; and
(6) Arkansas seeks to act to implement Congress’s
announced policy of “examining a company’s promotion or
compliance with unsanctioned boycotts, divestment from, or
sanctions against Israel as part of its consideration in
awarding grants and contracts and supports the divestment
of state assets from companies that support or promote
actions to boycott, divest from, or sanction Israel.”47

For the purposes of the statute, the term “boycott of Israel”
means:
[E]ngaging in refusals to deal, terminating business
activities, or other actions that are intended to limit
commercial relations with Israel, or persons or entities doing
business in Israel or in Israeli-controlled territories, in a
discriminatory manner.48

45. 19 U.S.C. § 4452(b)(1), (b)(4) (emphasis added).
46. See e.g., EAA of 1977, supra note 30; President Carter Anti-Boycott Signing
Statement, supra note 10.
47. ARK. CODE ANN. § 25-1-501 (2017) (emphasis added).
48. § 25-1-502(1)(A)(i) (emphasis added). Note that a decision not to engage in
business with Israel for non-discriminatory reasons is perfectly fine.
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Operationally, the Act requires entities who wish to do
business with the State of Arkansas to sign a certification stating
that they are not currently boycotting Israel as defined by the Act,
and do not intend to boycott Israel for the duration of the
contract.49 It is worth reiterating that the law only applies to
discriminatory boycotts, and non-discriminatory boycotts are not
subject to the certification requirement.50 If a party was, for
example, boycotting all Middle East countries, or all companies
that work with militaries, or all companies that provide tech for
security forces, without regard to the country of origin, that would
not be a discriminatory boycott under the Act. A party could sign
the certification and if ever asked, simply show that the boycott
was not discriminatory. Regardless, even if a company is not
willing to sign such a statement, it can still do business with the
State if its price comes in at 20% less than the lowest certifying
business,51 an amount the legislature has deemed enough to make
up for the greater inherent risk involved in doing business with a
company that makes political rather than economically sound
business decisions.
III. THE LAWSUIT
The Arkansas Times is a free weekly newspaper that has
never actually boycotted Israel. Nevertheless, in October 2018,
the paper decided to file a test case against Act 710, challenging
it on the grounds that it conditioned State contracts “on the
unconstitutional suppression . . . of protected speech[,]”52 and
seeking injunctive and declaratory relief, based on alleged
violations of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. It argued
“that the law impermissibly compels speech regarding
contractors’ political beliefs, association, and expression[,]” and
that it imposes an unconstitutional condition on funding by
impermissibly restricting “state contractors from engaging in
protected First Amendment activities, including boycott
49. § 25-1-503(a)(1).
50. § 25-1-502(1)(A)(i).
51. § 25-1-503(b)(1).
52. Brief for Petitioner-Appellant at 5, Ark. Times LP v. Waldrip, 988 F.3d 453 (8th
Cir. 2021) (No. 19-1378).
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participation and boycott-related speech, without a legitimate
justification.”53
It was especially surprising and disheartening that liberal
groups like the ACLU, which filed on behalf of the Arkansas
Times, came out in support of the plaintiffs and argued against
the general rule that commercial decisions to buy or not to buy
are not protected by the First Amendment.54 It is surprising
because, as noted above, they are arguing against literally the very
same rule that they have championed publicly and consistently in
other contexts when it better suited their ideological leanings.55
For example, upon rereading certain passages in the brief that the
ACLU filed in Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights
Commission,56 it is hard to find a better word to describe its
position here in the Arkansas case than hypocritical:
The Bakery is not the first business to claim a First
Amendment right to violate an antidiscrimination law . . . .
This Court has never accepted that premise, and has, instead,
affirmed repeatedly the government’s ability to prohibit
discriminatory conduct over the freedom of expression,
association, and religion objections of entities ranging from
law firms[;] . . . to private schools, and universities; to
membership organizations open to the public; to restaurants,
and newspapers. . . . “The Constitution does not guarantee
a right to choose employees, customers, suppliers, or those
with whom one engages in simple commercial transactions,
without restraint from the State.”57

53. Ark. Times LP v. Waldrip, 362 F. Supp. 3d 617, 621 (E.D. Ark. 2019) rev’d and
remanded, 988 F.3d 453 (8th Cir. 2021).
54. Arkansas Times LP v. Waldrip, ACLU, [https://perma.cc/5LF3-D68B] (May 9,
2019).
55. This is not entirely surprising. See Wendy Kaminer, The ACLU Retreats From
Free Expression, WALL ST. J. (June 20, 2018), [https://perma.cc/N2EM-6FCH] (noting the
ACLU’s 2018 guidelines assertion that case selection should involve an assessment of
whether it will advance the goals of those “whose views are contrary to our values . . . [i]n
selecting speech cases to defend, the ACLU will . . . balance the ‘impact of the proposed
speech and the impact of its suppression’”).
56. Brief for Respondents Charlie Craig and David Mullins at 14-15, Masterpiece
Cakeshop v. Colo. Civ. Rts. Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018) (No. 16-111).
57. Id. (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added). But see Hishon v. King &
Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 78 (1984); Ry. Mail Ass’n v. Corsi, 326 U.S. 88, 94 (1945); Runyon
v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 176 (1976), Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 60304 (1983); Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int’l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 549 (1987);
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The ACLU was also clear that this was in fact the general
rule for all commercial activity and all kinds of discrimination,
and was not somehow case specific:
While the particular facts of this case involve a bakery
refusing to sell a cake for the wedding reception of a samesex couple, the implications of the . . . arguments are not
limited to sexual orientation discrimination or weddings . . .
[a]nd, because “[i]t is possible to find some kernel of
expression in almost every activity a person undertakes,” a
wide range of businesses could claim a First Amendment
exemption from generally applicable regulations of
commercial conduct. . . . To recognize either of the Bakery’s
asserted First Amendment objections would run counter to
the basic principle, reflected in over a century of public
accommodation laws, that all people, regardless of status,
should be able to receive equal service in American
commercial life.
....
The State’s prohibition against discrimination in the sale of
goods and services to the public is a regulation of
commercial conduct that affects expression only incidentally
. . . [b]usinesses, the court has held, have “no constitutional
right . . . to discriminate.”58

As several prominent amicus curiae in this case have already
pointed out, this idea is in fact “the foundation of the wide range
of antidiscrimination laws, public accommodation laws, and
common carrier laws throughout the nation.”59
It is unclear why the ACLU would change its position in this
case. Charitably, perhaps it is because it is not aware that the BDS
movement is actually antisemitic, and so it thinks that states do
not have a compelling interest in combatting it with antidiscrimination laws. Unfortunately, as evidenced by the
statements of the movement’s leaders, and its founding

Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., 390 U.S. 400, 402-03 n.5 (1968) (per curiam); Pittsburgh
Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm’n on Human Rels., 413 U.S. 376, 389 (1973).
58. Brief for Respondents, supra note 56, at 2-15.
59. Brief of Profs. Michael C. Dorf et. al. as Amici Curiae in Support of DefendantsAppellees at 1, Ark. Times LP v. Waldrip, 988 F.3d 453 (8th Cir. 2021) (No. 19-1378), 2019
WL 2488957.
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documents, that line of thinking is both wrong on its face and
wrong as applied.
BDS leaders often use classic antisemitic tropes to make
their arguments “including, but not limited to, false accusations
of Jewish conspiracies; blood libels; portraying Jews ( . . . not just
Israelis but caricatures of religious Jews) as Satanic, demonic,
and evil (at times even using actual Nazi propaganda), accusing
Jews of dual loyalty, and engaging in Holocaust denial and
Holocaust inversion.”60 In terms of its practical effect, the BDS
movement discriminates against Jewish people in an absurdly
clear and disproportionate manner: 95% of American Jews
support the State of Israel61 which is the definition of Zionism that
BDS targets. A movement that discriminates against 95% of a
group based on its members’ shared ethnic beliefs is
discriminatory toward that group, and a state has the right not to
subsidize or further that movement’s discriminatory goals.
But even if the BDS movement was not generally
antisemitic, that would also be irrelevant for the purposes of this
statute and for the proper disposition of this case. The statutes in
question, including the Arkansas statute, do not target BDS
supporters, or even the BDS movement as a whole;62 by definition
the law in question (and BDS laws and anti-discrimination laws
generally) only affect discriminatory conduct in commercial
activity, i.e., when the action taken is based on race, color,
religion, gender, or national origin.63 In this case, the Act does
not affect decisions not to deal with Israel that are based on
economic reasons, or the specific conduct of a person or firm.
The only way we could possibly know that a company’s buying
decisions were based on discriminatory reasons and not economic
60. See Mark Goldfeder, The Danger of Defining Your Own Terms: Responding to the
Harvard Law Review on Antidiscrimination Law and the Movement for Palestinian
Rights, 3.2 J. CONTEMP. ANTISEMITISM 141, 143 (2020). It should also be obvious that
saying Jews are not a people while calling for the destruction of the world’s lone Jewish
state, along with the ethnic cleansing and/or the genocidal extermination of its millions of
Jewish inhabitants, is also antisemitic.
61. Frank Newport, American Jews, Politics and Israel, GALLUP (Aug. 27, 2019),
[https://perma.cc/74VQ-2AWZ].
62. It is also worth highlighting that while the BDS movement is antisemitic, that is not
a criticism of general Palestinian rights work and advocacy. See Goldfeder, supra note 60,
at 141, 143.
63. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 25-1-501(3) (2017).

1 GOLDFEDER.MAN.FIN COPY.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2022

2/11/22 3:21 PM

WHY ARKANSAS ACT 710 WAS UPHELD

621

ones would be if it told us, in accompanying speech, that it was
taking this action in order to discriminate. Certainly, we should
all be able to agree that when BDS, by admission, involves nonexpressive discriminatory conduct, it can and should be regulated
by anti-discrimination law.64
Now to be fair, the truth is that a casual observer (not the
lawyers at the ACLU) might be excused for some confusion in
this case because of the use of the term “boycott” in the statute.
The term “boycott” could, in some contexts, refer to the kinds of
boycott activities that are protected by the First Amendment. The
fact is though that none of the state laws in question, including
Arkansas Act 710, regulate that kind of expressive boycott
activity, and indeed they could not legally do so.
As the Supreme Court ruled in NAACP v. Claiborne
Hardware Co.,65 a case about a primary boycott of white-owned
businesses to protest racial discrimination in Mississippi,66 “[t]he
right of the States to regulate economic activity could not justify
a complete prohibition against a nonviolent, politically motivated
boycott designed to force governmental and economic change and
to effectuate rights guaranteed by the Constitution itself.”67 No
one involved in the Arkansas case (or with any of the state antiBDS bills for that matter) in any way disagrees with that principle.
The boycott in Claiborne involved a range of First
Amendment protected activities, including speeches, picketing,
the sending of telegrams and the publication of lists, etc.68
“Crucially, Claiborne did not ‘address purchasing decisions or

64. The argument that an individual’s refusal to deal, or his purchasing decisions, when
taken in connection with a larger social movement, do become inherently expressive is also
unpersuasive. “Such an argument is foreclosed by FAIR, as individual law schools were
effectively boycotting military recruiters as part of a larger protest against the Don’t Ask,
Don’t Tell policy.” Ark. Times LP v. Waldrip, 362 F. Supp. 3d 617, 624 (E.D. Ark. 2019);
see Rumsfeld v. F. for Acad. & Inst. Rights, Inc. (‘‘FAIR’’), 547 U.S. 47, 66 (2006).
65. 458 U.S. 886 (1982).
66. Id. at 889. A boycott by those whose constitutional rights were being infringed
upon and against those who were infringing upon those rights, as opposed to a secondary
political boycott directed towards foreign governments against longstanding U.S. policy. See
Int’l Longshoremen’s Ass’n, AFL-CIO v. Allied Int’l, Inc., 456 U.S. 212, 218-19 (1982).
67. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. at 914.
68. See id. at 889, 902, 907.
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other non-expressive conduct.’”69 As former Solicitor General
Paul Clement has explained, what Claiborne did was affirm that
those elements of a boycott that do involve protected First
Amendment activity do not lose that protection simply because
they are accompanied by elements that are not expressive.70 But
“[a]t no point did the Court suggest that the mere act of refusing
to deal—accompanied by no protected conduct like speech or
picketing—constitutes ‘inherently expressive’ conduct” entitled
to First Amendment protection.71
The Court in Claiborne also did not address whether the First
Amendment would protect a refusal to deal with someone that is
forbidden under state anti-discrimination law because at the time
there were no laws in Mississippi that prohibited racial
discrimination. “Nor was the boycott banned by general
prohibitions on ‘concerted refusal to deal,’ ‘secondary boycotts,’
or ‘restraint[s] of trade[]’ . . . . Indeed, Claiborne Hardware
expressly reserved the question whether a boycott ‘designed to
secure aims that are themselves prohibited by a valid state law’ is
constitutionally protected.”72
That question was left open by Claiborne but conclusively
resolved by the Supreme Court in Rumsfeld v. FAIR: to the extent
that such a boycott involves non-expressive activity, that activity
is not protected.73

69. Ark. Times LP, 362 F. Supp. 3d at 625 (quoting Jordahl v. Brnovich, Case No. 1816896, Dkt. No. 26 slip op. at 5 (9th Cir. Oct. 31, 2018) (Ikuta, J., dissenting)).
70. Brief for Amicus Curiae Christians United for Israel in Support of DefendantAppellees’ Petition for Rehearing En Banc at 7, Ark. Times LP v. Waldrip, 988 F.3d 453
(8th Cir. 2021) (No. 19-1378), 2021 WL 1603995.
71. Id.
72. Brief in Support of Defendants-Appellees, supra note 59, at 7 (quoting Claiborne
Hardware Co., 458 U.S. at 891 n.7, 894, 915). “The holding of Claiborne is thus consistent
with the principle set forth just six years before in Runyon v. McCrary: Though people and
institutions have a right to advocate for discrimination . . . ‘it does not follow that the practice
of excluding racial minorities from such institutions is also protected by the same principle.’”
Id. at 7-8 (quoting Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 176 (1976)).
73. 547 U.S. 47, 65-66 (2006). Rumsfeld involved law schools engaged in a boycott
of military recruiters to protest the military’s then-extant “Don’t Ask Don’t Tell” policy. See
id. at 52. The Court held that such conduct was “not inherently expressive” because the
actions “were expressive only because the law schools accompanied their conduct with
speech explaining it.” Id. at 66; Ark. Times LP, 362 F. Supp. 3d at 623. Otherwise, no one
would know for sure why the recruiters were not there. Rumsfeld, 547 U.S. at 66.
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In addition, the BDS movement is fairly open74 about the
fact that, as opposed to the primary boycott activity in Claiborne,
for the most part, BDS activities take the form of secondary and
tertiary boycotts.75 A primary boycott is generally one in which
the boycotter is acting against the entity that it has a grievance
with; a secondary boycott is one in which the party boycotting an
entity has a goal of affecting a third party, rather than the
boycotted entity. A tertiary boycott is one in which the goal is to
affect a fourth party, who supports the third party supporting the
boycotted entity.76 BDS activists say that their issue is with the
State of Israel, but the bulk of their targets are not the government
of Israel, but rather companies doing business in or with Israel (a
secondary boycott) and the people that support them (a tertiary
boycott). Unlike in Claiborne, “[t]he BDS supporters are not
trying to protect their own constitutional rights[]” from those who
are oppressing them; “they are trying to use commerce to inflict
harm on a foreign nation[.]”77 “In both Claiborne and
International Longshoremen’s Association,78 the Supreme Court
explicitly stated that secondary boycotts are not accorded the
same types of protections under the First Amendment as primary
boycotts.”79 In fact, the Court in Longshoremen actually upheld
a law regulating boycott activity directed at a matter covered by
U.S. foreign policy, “conclud[ing] that boycotts that impede
United States commerce and are political protests intended to
punish foreign nations for their offshore conduct may [in fact] be
limited by the government.”80
74. See, e.g., TOWARDS A GLOBAL MOVEMENT, supra note 18.
75. See Goldfeder, supra note 35, at 223-31.
76. See generally Presentation by the Office of Antiboycott Compliance in the Bureau
of Industry and Security in the U.S Department of Commerce, [https://perma.cc/EA7YQ6CK].
77. Goldfeder, supra note 35, at 224.
78. NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 917 (1982); Int’l
Longshoremen’s Ass’n, AFL-CIO v. Allied Int’l, Inc., 456 U.S. 212, 216-17 (1982).
79. See Greendorfer, supra note 12, at 58 (first citing Claiborne, 458 U.S. at
912 (“Secondary boycotts and picketing by labor unions may be prohibited . . . .”); then
citing Longshoremen, 456 U.S. at 226-27 n.123 (“holding that a law prohibiting secondary
boycotts did not violate the First Amendment and stating, ‘[i]t would seem even clearer that
conduct designed not to communicate, but to coerce, merits still less consideration under the
First Amendment.’”)).
80. Goldfeder, supra note 35, at 229 (emphasis added) (citing Longshoremen, 456 U.S.
at 221).
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Of course, BDS activists like to conflate protected and
unprotected activities,81 which is exactly why the state had to
clarify that the mere use of the term boycott “to refer to one’s
commercial choices does not create a First Amendment right to
contract, or not to contract.”82 The clear distinction between
expressive and non-expressive “boycott” activity is precisely why
the legislature in Arkansas defined the term “boycott” in the
statute to only refer to a company’s non-expressive commercial
choices.83 Contractors with the State remain absolutely free to
engage in any and all expressive boycott activity against Israel.
The Arkansas Times may, for example, “send representatives to
meetings, speeches, and picketing events in opposition to Israel’s
81. Indeed, the ACLU relied extensively on a cherrypicked recitation of Claiborne in
briefing this case. See generally Appellant’s Opening Brief, Ark. Times LP v. Waldrip, 362
F. Supp. 3d 617 (E.D. Ark. 2019) (No. 19-1378), 2019 WL 1756930; Appellant’s Reply
Brief, Ark. Times LP v. Waldrip, 362 F. Supp. 3d 617 (E.D. Ark. 2019) (No. 19-1378), 2019
WL 3208596.
82. Brief in Support of Defendants-Appellees, supra note 59, at 5, 7. For instance, “[a]
limousine driver cannot refuse to serve a same-sex wedding party, even if he describes this
as a boycott of same-sex weddings (or part of a nationwide boycott of such weddings by
like-minded citizens).” Id. at 2. By that very same token, it should be obvious that:
A cab driver who is required to serve all passengers cannot refuse to take
people who are visibly carrying Israeli merchandise. Of course all these people
would have every right to speak out against same-sex weddings . . . and Israel.
That would be speech, which is indeed protected by the First Amendment. But
as a general matter, a decision not to do business with someone, even when it
is politically motivated (and even when it is part of a broader political
movement), is not protected by the First Amendment. And though people
might have the First Amendment right to discriminate (or boycott) in some
unusual circumstances—for instance when they refuse to participate in
distributing or creating speech they disapprove of—that is a basis for a narrow
as-applied challenge, not a facial one.
Id. at 2-3.
83. To the extent that anyone really does believe that such a boycott is expressive, then
the reverse should also be true, and the State of Arkansas’s decision not to do business with
those who engage in discrimination should be considered government speech, not a
regulation of private speech. See Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc.,
135 S. Ct. 2239, 2245 (2015); Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 467–68
(2009). “[A]s a general matter, when the government speaks it is entitled to promote a
program, to espouse a policy, or to take a position. In doing so, it represents its citizens and
it carries out its duties on their behalf.” ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, THE FIRST AMENDMENT 49
(Wolters Kluwer 2019). The Supreme Court has continually refused “[t]o hold that the
Government unconstitutionally discriminates on the basis of viewpoint when it chooses to
fund a program dedicated to advance certain permissible goals, because the program in
advancing those goals necessarily discourages alternative goals[.]” Id. (citing Rust v.
Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 194 (1991)).
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policies . . . call upon others to boycott Israel, write in support of
such boycotts, and engage in picketing and pamphleteering to that
effect[]” and the State can say nothing about it.84 This does not
mean, however, that the newspaper’s non-expressive commercial
decisions are also protected by the First Amendment.85
And so, it was not surprising when the district court—based
on the well-established rule that particular commercial
purchasing decisions do not themselves communicate ideas86—
rejected the Plaintiff’s shallow surface comparison of the
“boycott” activities proscribed in Act 710 to the activities in
Claiborne and denied the Plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary
injunction, while granting the Defendants’ motion to dismiss.87
The court correctly concluded that a boycott of Israel, as
defined by the Act,88 commercial actions undertaken in a
discriminatory way, is “neither speech nor inherently expressive
conduct[]” and is thus not entitled to First Amendment
protection.89 Such actions are only expressive when the conduct
is accompanied by speech that explains it.90 As the court noted:
Very few people readily know which types of goods are
Israeli, and even fewer are able to keep track of which
businesses sell to Israel. Still fewer, if any, would be able to
point to the fact that the absence of certain goods from a
contractor’s office mean that the contractor is engaged in a
boycott of Israel. Instead, an observer would simply believe
that the types of products located at the contractor’s office
reflect its commercial, as opposed to its political,
preferences. In most, if not all cases, a contractor would
have to explain to an observer that it is engaging in a boycott
for the observer to have any idea that a boycott is taking
place. And under FAIR, the fact that such conduct may be
subsequently explained by speech does not mean that this
84. Ark. Times LP, 362 F. Supp. 3d at 625.
85. Id.
86. See id. at 624.
87. See Ark. Times LP v. Waldrip, 988 F.3d 453, 458 (8th Cir. 2021).
88. I.e., a refusal to deal or a company’s purchasing decisions. Ark. Times LP, 362 F.
Supp. 3d at 623.
89. Id.; see Pickup v. Brown, 740 F.3d 1208, 1225 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Rumsfeld
v. F. for Acad. & Inst. Rights, Inc. (“FAIR II”), 547 U.S. 47, 66 (2006)) (“The Supreme Court
has made clear that First Amendment protection does not apply to conduct that is not
‘inherently expressive.’”).
90. See FAIR II, 547 U.S. at 66.
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conduct is, or can be, transformed into inherently expressive
conduct. (“The fact that . . . explanatory speech is necessary
is strong evidence that . . . conduct . . . is not so inherently
expressive that it warrants protection.”).91

Arkansas Times appealed, and in February 2021, the Eighth
Circuit issued an opinion reversing the decision and remanding
the case back to the district court for further findings.92
IV. A NARROW (AND VERY STRANGE) APPELLATE
DECISION
This is where the purposeful misreporting comes in, with
BDS activists falsely claiming that the anti-BDS law in Arkansas
had been struck down as unconstitutional.93 Here is what actually
happened in the Eight Circuit’s extremely narrow opinion
reversing the district court’s decision to immediately dismiss the
case.
First and foremost, the court accepted the fairly obvious
principle that commercial buying decisions are not inherently
expressive.94
Far from being an adverse ruling, that
understanding alone confirms the constitutionality of anti-BDS
laws across the country.
Perhaps because the Arkansas Times is not actually
boycotting Israel, and the court felt the need to find an
interpretation of the Act that could even possibly apply to it such
that it would have a potential claim, the majority opinion chose to
focus on one phrase in the definition of boycott that (according to
the court) could reasonably be misconstrued as applying to
actually expressive conduct. Again, the Act defines “boycott of
Israel” to mean:
(1) “engaging in refusals to deal”;

91. Ark. Times LP, 362 F. Supp. 3d at 624. The Court also noted in Longshoremen that
“[i]t would seem even clearer that conduct designed not to communicate but to coerce merits
still less consideration under the First Amendment.” Int’l Longshoremen’s Ass’n, AFL-CIO
v. Allied Int’l, Inc., 456 U.S. 212, 226 (1982).
92. Ark. Times LP, 988 F.3d at 458, 467.
93. Federal Court Rules Arkansas Anti-Boycott Law Violates First Amendment,
PALESTINE LEGAL (Feb. 18, 2021), [https://perma.cc/XH7N-PD5A].
94. Ark. Times LP, 988 F.3d at 460.
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(2) “terminating business activities”; or
(3) “other actions that are intended to limit commercial
relations with Israel, or persons or entities doing business in
Israel or in Israeli-controlled territories, in a discriminatory
manner.”95

The State has consistently insisted that, like the activities
described in subsections (1) and (2), the phrase “other actions” in
subsection (3) is clearly also limited to similar non-expressive
commercial conduct and indeed has reiterated many times that
any and all contractors are in fact free to express their feelings
about Israel in any way that they want, including but not limited
to criticizing Israel, lobbying against Act 710 itself, and even
advocating for boycotts.96 In fact, in this very case, the Arkansas
Times itself had done those things, and the State had no problem
with it.97 The court, however, felt that because that phrase “is
open to more than one plausible construction,” it was still too
ambiguous.98
The court did note that the district court had used the
appropriate canon of ejusdem generis to understand the meaning
of the phrase “other actions” in the statute.99 Ejusdem generis is
the principle of statutory construction which says that “when
general words follow specific words in a statutory enumeration
the general words are construed to embrace only objects similar
in nature to those objects enumerated by the preceding specific
words.”100 Applied to the Act, the term “other actions” should
obviously be read to include only conduct similar in kind to the
terms that precede it: “refusals to deal” and “terminating business
activities,” i.e. non-expressive commercial activity. But then, in
a truly mystifying manner, the court decided not to follow the
correct canon of construction and instead to “look to the statute
as a whole to interpret it according to the legislative intent[].”101
95. ARK. CODE ANN. § 25-1-502(1)(A)(i) (2017).
96. Defendants-Appellees’ Brief at 4, Ark. Times LP, 988 F.3d 453 (No. 19-1378).
97. Id. at 8.
98. Ark. Times LP, 988 F.3d at 464.
99. Id.
100. Hanley v. Ark. State Claims Comm’n, 333 Ark. 159, 167, 970 S.W.2d 198, 201
(1998).
101. Ark. Times LP, 988 F.3d at 464-65 (citing Simpson v. Cavalry SPV I, LLC, 2014
Ark. 363, at 3, 440 S.W.3d 335, 338).
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Incredibly, this reference to legislative intent was offered as a
reason for the court to disagree with the district court’s reading,
despite the fact that the legislative intent in passing the bill,
confirmed repeatedly by the legislature’s own representatives,
was clearly (and demonstrably, based on their relationship with
the Plaintiff-Appellees in this very case) for that section to be read
exclusively in the way that the district court did, i.e., as applying
only to non-expressive commercial conduct.
The only justification that the court seemed to give for the
decision to ignore both the text and the readily apparent
legislative intent was to note that “the State has not provided any
example of the type of conduct that, under their interpretation of
the Act, would fall in the ‘other actions’ category[,]”102 as if to
say that the concern about other discriminatory non-expressive
commercial conduct could not really be the reason for subsection
(3) and to imply that the State’s position was just apologetics.
This is a logically flawed and lazy argument.
First, the legislature does not have to specify every single
behavior that could be referenced, so long as it sufficiently
delineates the type of behavior being prohibited. In this instance,
the type of behavior being referred to is clearly, contextually,
discriminatory non-expressive commercial conduct.
Second, there are numerous behaviors that fit into that
category, i.e., cases where a party is discriminating in commercial
decision making against Israel or Israelis while not technically
refusing to deal or terminating business relations, and it was these
actions that the Arkansas Legislature clearly meant to cover.
Some easy examples of the kind of constitutionally
unprotected activity that the “other actions” clause covers could
include, but are not limited to, a refusal to give equal commercial
access/opportunities to an Israeli person or group (like the access
that was denied in the FAIR case that the court discusses at
length).103 That action is broader than a simple refusal to deal but,
if done for discriminatory reasons, would also fall under
subsection (3). Likewise, another type of behavior in that
category of “other actions” that are discriminatory non-expressive
102. Id. at 464.
103. See generally Rumsfeld v. F. for Acad. & Inst. Rts., 547 U.S. 47 (2006).
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commercial decisions would be the classic BDS tactic of a
conditional refusal to deal, i.e., a scenario in which a company
discriminatorily says that it will do business with Israelis but only
if the Israeli group or individual (as opposed to every other group
or individual it is willing to do business with) first meets a set of
conditions.104 Or, as the dissent points out, “consider the
following: a company begins charging overly-inflated shipping
prices for products shipped to Israel to reduce commercial
relationships with the country. While this is not a refusal to deal
or a termination of business activities, it is another ‘action . . .
intended to limit commercial relations with Israel.’”105
Finally, and seeing as the court was ostensibly looking for
legislative intent this whole time, perhaps most convincingly, the
Arkansas General Assembly’s very purposeful choice of
language actually points directly to the type of behavior it
intended to cover with the statute. Anti-boycott laws106 and antidiscrimination laws107 are “not the only federal law[s] implicated
by the BDS Movement[.]”108 As the 1976 House Boycott Report
and the accompanying Department of Justice analysis109
concluded, anti-Israel boycotts that affect U.S. businesses also
violate anti-trust laws.110 In fact, the phrase that the Arkansas
104. See, e.g., Todd Gitlin & Nissim Calderon, A Counterproductive Call to Boycott
Israel’s Universities, NEW REPUBLIC (Oct. 10, 2010), [https://perma.cc/5QPZ-TEHP]. A
prime and well publicized example of this process, which also belied the movement’s
underlying antisemitism, was the BDS movement’s 2015 attempted boycotting of JewishAmerican (non-Israeli) reggae star Matthew Paul Miller. The singer, also known as
“Matisyahu,” was scheduled to perform at the Spanish Rototom Sunsplash Festival in August
2015, but when the BDS movement got wind of his performance, its members pressured the
festival to demand that Matisyahu, the only Jewish artist invited, issue a statement in support
of Palestinian statehood as a condition for the opportunity to perform. That condition was
not placed on any other artist at the festival. See Donna Rachel Edmunds, Jewish Rapper
Matisyahu Banned by Israel Boycotters . . . Except He’s Not Israeli, BREITBART (Aug. 17,
2015), [https://perma.cc/8PFJ-7RV4].
105. Ark. Times LP, 988 F.3d at 468 (Kobes, J., dissenting).
106. See, e.g., EAA of 1977, supra note 30.
107. See, e.g., Title VI, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1964).
108. Greendorfer, supra note 11, at 97.
109. Written by the late Justice Antonin Scalia, at the time an Assistant Attorney
General at the Department of Justice. See Arab Boycott: Hearings on H.R. 5246, H.R. 12383
and H.R. 11488 Before the Subcomm. on Monopolies & Com. L. of the Comm. on the
Judiciary, 94th Cong. 68-74 (1975) (statement of Antonin Scalia, Assistant Attorney
General, Department of Justice).
110. Greendorfer, supra note 11, at 97.
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Legislature used in subsection (1) of Act 710, a “refusal to deal,”
comes directly from the anti-trust caselaw.111 In passing the
Sherman Antitrust Act:112
What the government was most concerned with was a
scenario where, due to pressure from the Arab League, one
United States entity would refuse to deal with another entity
that was being targeted by the Arab League for having
relations with Israel. Such a refusal to deal would not only
have damaging effects on United States commerce and
competition, it would, in essence, be a private usurpation of
the federal government’s exclusive authority to regulate
commerce. In the House Legal Analysis, [later-to-be]
Justice Scalia cited to Fashion Originators Guild of America
v. F.T.C [] in support of his argument that such boycotts
are prima facie illegal. . . . In the same way, the BDS
Movement’s activities put the regulation of commerce into
private, indeed hostile, foreign hands.113

That concern over a secondary/tertiary refusal to deal that is
at the heart of the Sherman Antitrust Act is a perfect description
of yet another type of “other actions” that are discriminatory but
non-expressive commercial activity. Seen in this light, the most
obvious reading of the statute is that the Arkansas General
Assembly intended and indeed incorporated all of the regular and
contextually appropriate anti-trust meanings of “refusal to deal,”
including other related non-expressive coercive business actions
undertaken with the same discriminatory intent. Again, the
legislative findings state that:
(4) It is the public policy of the United States, as enshrined
in several federal acts, to oppose boycotts against Israel, and
. . . Congress has concluded as a matter of national trade
policy that cooperation with Israel materially benefits United
States
companies
and
improves
American
competitiveness.114
111. See e.g., Kathryn A. Kusske, Refusal to Deal as a Per Se Violation of the Sherman
Act: Russell Stover Attacks the Colgate Doctrine, 33 AM. U. L. REV. 463, 463-64 (1984); see
also Kenneth Glazer, Concerted Refusals to Deal Under Section 1 of the Sherman Act,
70 ANTITRUST L.J. 1, 1-2 (2002) for an overview of Sherman Act principles, especially as
they relate to group boycotts.
112. Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1-7.
113. Greendorfer, supra note 11, at 99-100.
114. ARK. CODE ANN. § 25-1-501(4) (2017) (emphasis added).
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In the definition section, subsection (1), the legislature
referenced a classic refusal to deal as an example of the kind of
behavior that would obviously fall under the statute.115 Then it
clarified in subsection (3), for those who may not be familiar with
this area of law, that, consistent with the legal and historical usage
of the term “refusal to deal” in this very context, if a party were to
take “other actions that are intended to limit commercial relations
with Israel, or persons or entities doing business in Israel”—for
example, if they were to make business decisions designed to
force or coerce another party to refuse to deal with the target of a
boycott (i.e. a secondary or tertiary boycott), even while never
engaging in the actual boycott themselves, that too would be the
kind of discriminatory commercial action that (aside from the
federal concerns) would be (a) problematic under Act 710, and
(b) not entitled to First Amendment protection.116 Outsourcing
discrimination does not make it better,117 and the Arkansas
Legislature had every right to include that concern, decades old
in the context of anti-Israel boycotts, in its deliberate
considerations.
Regardless, the divided Eighth Circuit panel felt that the
legislature had not been clear enough about its intent to limit the
statute to non-expressive activity.118 While it is not uncommon
for courts to find a statute void for vagueness, in this instance it
really looks like the court set out to find the statute vague for
voidness.119 Then, incredibly, instead of being content with
merely casting the language as ambiguous, the court offered as
“proof” of the legislatures’ real intent the fact that the statute:
[P]ermits the State to consider specified “type[s] of
evidence” to determine whether “a company is participating
115. § 25-1-502(1)(A)(i).
116. See generally Int’l Longshoremen’s Ass’n, AFL-CIO v. Allied Int’l, Inc., 456
U.S. 212 (1982); NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886 (1982); Briggs &
Stratton Corp. v. Baldrige, 728 F.2d 915 (7th Cir. 1984).
117. See generally Greendorfer, supra note 11; see Marc A. Greendorfer, The
Inapplicability of First Amendment Protections to BDS Movement Boycotts, 2016 CARDOZO
L. REV. DE NOVO 112, 113 (2016).
118. Ark. Times LP v. Waldrip, 988 F.3d 453, 464-65 (8th Cir. 2021).
119. See generally Philip B. Kurland, Egalitarianism and the Warren Court, 68 MICH.
L. REV. 629 (1970); see id. at 667 n.178 (“A keen analysis of the partisan use of the voidfor-vagueness doctrine may be found in Note, The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the
Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L REV. 67, 75-85, 98-115 (1960).”).
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in a boycott of Israel.” This evidence includes the
company’s own “statement that it is participating in boycotts
of Israel.” Additionally, evidence that a government
contractor “has taken the boycott action” in association with
others . . . can be considered to enforce the Act. At a
minimum, therefore, a company’s speech and association
with others may be considered to determine whether the
company is participating in a “boycott of Israel,” and the
State may refuse to enter into a contract with the company
on that basis, thereby limiting what a company may say or
do in support of such a boycott. In this way, the Act
implicates the First Amendment rights of speech, assembly,
association, and petition recognized to be constitutionally
protected boycott activity.120

The only problem with that reading, as the dissent forcefully
points out, is that this very line of reasoning was firmly rejected
by a unanimous Supreme Court:
The First Amendment . . . does not prohibit the evidentiary
use of speech . . . to prove motive or intent.121
....
Here, a company only engages in a boycott of Israel if its
“other actions are intended to limit commercial relations
with Israel, or persons or entities doing business in Israel or
in Israeli-controlled territories.” The better (and
constitutionally permissible) understanding of the permitted
use of speech here is that it may establish the element of
intent. The prohibited conduct is still commercial.122

The majority’s fierce determination to find some reading of
the statute that could be problematic, while ignoring clear
language and precedent, is truly bizarre. The text, history, and
application of the law make it clear that the legislature only ever
intended to do exactly what the statute says, i.e., regulate
discriminatory non-expressive commercial activity. Even in this
very case, the Arkansas Times itself actually did publish multiple
articles critical of the Act, and the State was still more than willing
to do business with it so long as the paper would certify that its
120. Ark. Times LP, 988 F.3d at 465.
121. Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 489 (1993).
122. Ark. Times LP, 988 F.3d at 468 (Kobes, J., dissenting) (quoting ARK. CODE ANN.
§ 25-1-502(1)(A)(I) (2017)).
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non-expressive commercial activity was in fact nondiscriminatory.123 The court’s refusal to acknowledge even the
possibility that the legislature intended to legislate within
constitutional bounds, hidden away in footnote 12 of the opinion,
is nothing short of remarkable:
The district court relied upon the doctrine of constitutional
avoidance to conclude that “other actions” referred to purely
commercial conduct. Constitutional avoidance is the
“bedrock principle” that “where a statute is susceptible of
two constructions, by one of which grave and doubtful
constitutional questions arise and by the other of which such
questions are avoided, [the court] is to adopt the latter” out
of respect for the legislature, assumed to legislate “in the
light of constitutional limitations.” But “the canon of
constitutional avoidance comes into play only when, after
the application of ordinary textual analysis, the statute is
found to be susceptible of more than one construction; and
the canon functions as a means of choosing between them.”
When considering the whole Act, as Arkansas law requires,
there is but one permissible interpretation—that the Act
restricts speech in addition to economic refusals to deal with
Israel.124

That line, which is at the crux of this entire decision, is
astounding. Not only is there clearly, demonstrably, explicitly,
another permissible interpretation—all of the evidence actually
suggests that this other interpretation is the correct one! Again,
as the dissent explains in no uncertain terms:
In Arkansas, “[t]he first and most important rule of statutory
interpretation is that a statute is presumed constitutional and
all doubts are resolved in favor of constitutionality.” To
honor this principle, “[i]f it is possible to construe a statute
as constitutional, we must do so.” (“All statutes are
presumed constitutional, and if it is possible to construe a
statute so as to pass constitutional muster, this court will do
so.”). That is plainly possible here, and I would “construe

123. Id. at 460, 470.
124. Id. at 466 n.12 (emphasis added) (first quoting Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. U.S. Dep’t
of Homeland Sec., 738 F.3d 885, 892-93 (8th Cir. 2013); and then quoting Saxton v. Fed.
Hous. Fin. Agency, 901 F.3d 954, 959 (8th Cir. 2018)).
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[the] statute with a limiting interpretation to preserve [its]
constitutionality.”125

Still not done, in yet another effort to find a problem with
the statute’s application, the majority continued its dubious
reading of the facts by claiming that “the certification makes no
effort to provide the Act’s definition of ‘boycott of Israel,’ leaving
it to the contractor to determine what activity is prohibited.”126
As an aside, it is hard to even know what to respond to that
patently false statement, because the certification form itself is
literally attached to the opinion as an appendix, and it very plainly
begins with the words: “Pursuant to Arkansas Code Annotated §
25-1-503[.]”127
Regardless, having observed that a contractor could perhaps
misread the statute as applying to protected speech, the court next
considered whether the Act imposed a restriction outside of the
program itself, because even if it did implicate speech, the State
would be justified in regulating speech that fell within the
contours of the contractual relationship.128 Of course, looking at
and reading it objectively, Act 710 is clearly designed to “define
the limits of the State’s spending program,” by making sure that
the State only does business with people making sound business
decisions.129 But having concluded that the law could be misread
as applying to protected speech as well, the court circularly found
that the condition therefore “seek[s] to ‘leverage funding to
regulate speech outside the contours of the program itself.’”130
In a final twist of omission, even supposing arguendo that
the wording in that subsection of the Act did impose on protected
First Amendment activity, the court declined to consider the
traditional balancing test used in unconstitutional conditions
cases. That test, first established in Pickering v. Board of

125. Id. at 469 (Kobes, J., dissenting) (first quoting Booker v. State, 335 Ark. 316, 325,
984 S.W.2d 16, 21 (1998); then quoting Reinert v. State, 348 Ark. 1, 4, 71 S.W.3d 52, 52
(2002); and then quoting Ark. Hearing Instrument Dispenser Bd. v. Vance, 359 Ark. 325,
331, 197 S.W.3d 495, 499 (2004)).
126. Id. at 466.
127. Ark. Times LP, 988 F.3d at 470.
128. Id. at 467.
129. Id. (alterations in original) (quotation omitted).
130. Id. (quotation omitted).
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Education,131 and later clarified in Connick v. Myers,132 balances
the public employee or contractor’s speech rights to comment on
matters of public concern against the government’s interest in
operational efficiency.133 As the Supreme Court has noted:
In striking that balance, we have concluded that “[t]he
government’s interest in achieving its goals as effectively
and efficiently as possible is elevated from a relatively
subordinate interest when it acts as sovereign to a significant
one when it acts as employer.” We have,
therefore, “consistently given greater deference to
government predictions of harm used to justify restriction of
employee speech than to predictions of harm used to justify
restrictions on the speech of the public at large.”134

As applied to Arkansas Act 710, the test would clearly favor
upholding an anti-discrimination bill that also has strong business
efficiency considerations (because it targets a friendly trade
partner and those who support it in a way that the State considers
risky)135 against the secondary and tertiary boycotting of a foreign
nation, which is not even necessarily related to a “matter of public
concern,”136 and the conducting of which the Arkansas public

131. 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968).
132. 461 U.S. 138, 154 (1983). While Pickering dealt with public employees, for our
purposes Board of County Commissioners v. Umbehr and O’Hare Truck Service,
Inc. expanded Pickering to the private sector. See Pickering, 391 U.S. at 569; Bd. of Cnty.
Comm’rs v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 700 (1996); O’Hare Truck Serv., Inc. v. City of
Northlake, 518 U.S. 712, 721 (1996).
133. See generally Joseph O. Oluwole, The Pickering Balancing Test and Public
Employment-Free Speech Jurisprudence: The Approaches of Federal Circuit Courts of
Appeals, 46 DUQ. L. REV. 133 (2008).
134. Umbehr, 518 U.S. at 676 (quoting Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 673, 675
(1994)); Greendorfer, supra note 12, at 65–66.
135. For example, a contractor might use a less efficient or more costly means of
fulfilling its contractual duties to the government because it wished to avoid using an Israeli
firm or product. Umbehr, 518 U.S. at 674.
136. See D. Gordon Smith, Beyond “Public Concern”: New Free Speech Standards
for Public Employees, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 249, 258-59 (1990). See also Greendorfer, supra
note 12, at 66-67 (“The typical Pickering case involves individuals who are speaking on a
matter of local (or, at least, domestic) concern, such as the functioning of school districts,
public hospitals, or local law enforcement. Certainly, such speech is valuable and important
to the functioning of a robust and healthy democracy. Economic attacks upon companies
that do business in a foreign nation to protest that foreign nation’s policies, however, have
remote and nebulous connections to the interests of a state and its citizens.”).
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itself finds deeply offensive.137 The Eighth Circuit, however, did
not apply the test.138
And so, in conclusion, all that the Eighth Circuit really did
do was two things:
First, and most importantly, the court restated the obvious;
limiting discriminatory non-expressive commercial activity does
not violate the First Amendment.
Second, having forced an ambiguous reading onto a
subsection of the Act, such that it could potentially be misapplied
to limit discriminatory expressive activity, the court remanded the
decision back to the district court for further proceedings
consistent with that ruling.139 It did not strike down the law as
unconstitutional. It reversed the granting of the State’s motion to
dismiss and asked the district court to reconsider whether the
Arkansas Times’s request for a preliminary injunction, at least as
applied to subsection (3), might in fact be appropriate.140
V. WHAT HAPPENS NEXT
Despite being remanded to the district court, this was an
obvious win for the State of Arkansas, which never intended to
limit anything but non-expressive commercial activity in the first
place. It is important to understand that nothing about the Eighth
Circuit’s opinion in any way damages the core tenet of anti-BDS

137. See Pereira v. Comm’r of Soc. Servs., 733 N.E.2d 112, 121 (2000) (quoting
Connick, 461 U.S. at 152) (factoring community relations into a Pickering-Connick
analysis).
138. The test did briefly come up in the 8th Circuit’s en banc rehearing of this matter
after one judge asked why the government’s ability to act as proprietor and choose whom to
do business with was not dispositive. The ACLU’s rather weak attempt to respond focused
on analogizing this case to the Pickering, 391 U.S. 563 and United States v. Treasury Emps.,
513 U.S. 454 (1995) cases, arguing that when the government is imposing an ex ante
restriction on expressive activity (which again it is not doing here, but for argument’s sake),
it should have to articulate a compelling interest and show how the proposal would help
eliminate a real harm. See generally Oral Arguments During en banc Rehearing, Ark. Times
LP v. Waldrip, No. 19-1378 (8th Cir. argued Sept. 21, 2021), [https://perma.cc/64YNXLD4] [hereinafter Oral Arguments During en banc Rehearing]. That answer was weak, of
course, because even on the ACLU’s own terms and understanding, the government of
Arkansas has done just that, explaining clearly its desire to eliminate this particular form of
discrimination.
139. Ark. Times LP, 988 F.3d at 467.
140. Id.
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legislation, or even the statute at the heart of this case. Indeed,
the principle upon which Arkansas Act 710 and similar laws rest
has actually been upheld and will be upheld once again:
discriminatory commercial purchasing decisions are not
protected under the First Amendment.141 As it relates to this bill,
under Arkansas law the provisions of a statute are severable, and
so even if subsection (3) were to be found invalid, the rest of the
statute is still fully constitutional and fine.142
***
After this Article was accepted for publication, Arkansas
filed a petition appealing to have this case reheard by the entire
Eighth Circuit sitting en banc, which was granted,143 and the case
was reheard shortly before this Article went to print.144 At the
hearing145 the judges focused on the dueling interpretations of
Claiborne and FAIR, but perhaps the most telling moment came
in a short discussion related to the technicalities of the
certification form itself.
141. See Aaron Bandler, Federal Appeals Court Sends Arkansas Anti-BDS Law to
Lower Court, JEWISH J. (Feb. 16, 2021), [https://perma.cc/WKW4-WQ4M] (“[S]tate antiBDS laws have always been about refusals to deal, not pro-BDS speech, so the decision
upheld much more than it rejected. Thus 8th Circuit ruling leaves intact not just the principal
part of Arkansas’s anti-BDS law, but also provides a strong precedent for the
constitutionality of such laws across the country, which quite clearly target pure business
conduct, not merely ‘supporting’ boycotts. Ironically, the plaintiff was not engaged in any
kind of Israel boycott—neither a refusal to deal, or even verbal support for it. They just
brought it as a test case, obscuring the fact that no one but the 2 8th circuit judges had read
‘any actions’ that way. While BDS champions will try to spin this as a win, the decision will
in fact keep anti-BDS laws on the books across the country.”) (quoting Eugene Kontorovich
(@EVKontorovich) TWITTER (Feb. 13, 2021, 4:13 PM), [https://perma.cc/9P5W-TBFW]).
142. See Eugene Volokh, The Eighth Circuit’s Narrow Decision About the Arkansas
BDS Statute, REASON (Feb. 14, 2021, 1:05 PM), [https://perma.cc/5RWU-LU6] (“Except as
otherwise specifically provided in this Code, in the event any title, subtitle, chapter,
subchapter, section, subsection, subdivision, paragraph, subparagraph, item, sentence,
clause, phrase, or word of this Code is declared or adjudged to be invalid or unconstitutional,
such declaration or adjudication shall not affect the remaining portions of this Code which
shall remain in full force and effect as if the portion so declared or adjudged invalid or
unconstitutional was not originally a part of this Code.”) (quoting ARK. CODE ANN. § 1-2117 (2016)).
143. See generally Order Granting Petition for en banc Rehearing, Ark. Times LP v.
Waldrip, (8th Cir. June 10, 2021) (No. 19-1378), [https://perma.cc/2DE8-JSYN].
144. U.S. CT. APPEALS EIGHT CIR., SEPTEMBER 20-21, 2021 ORAL ARGUMENTS VIA
TELECONFERENCE OR VIDEOCONFERENCE 4 (2021), [https://perma.cc/6NHS-2CP7] (case
reheard on September 21, 2021).
145. See generally Oral Arguments During en banc Rehearing, supra note 138.
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Judge Kelly, who had written the majority opinion in
February, asked Arkansas Solicitor General Nicholas J. Bronni if
perhaps by using the term “boycott” (instead of, for example, the
term “refusing to purchase”), the State of Arkansas had made the
whole matter more complicated, because while the certification
does admittedly refer back to the statute and its clear definition, it
does not specifically refer to the definition section of the statute,
and so some lay person might not read the definition and might,
therefore, misunderstand what the State actually meant to
regulate.146 Bronni answered that the statute and the form were
fairly self-explanatory and conformed to the vernacular
understanding of boycott.147 More importantly, as he explained,
Arkansas did not “redefine” the word boycott as Judge Kelly had
suggested—Claiborne itself made clear that there are protected
and non-protected aspects contained within the term boycott,
which is why Arkansas used the correct legal term and even took
the additional step of clarifying exactly what aspect it was
referring to.148
While the en banc decision is still forthcoming, for all of the
reasons listed above—including the clear rules of statutory
construction; the canon of constitutional avoidance; the list of
discriminatory, non-expressive “other actions” that subsection (3)
does cover, and the clear intent of the legislature not to target
expressive actions as demonstrated in its interactions with this
very plaintiff in this very case—it is more than likely that a
majority of judges faithfully applying the law would reverse the
Eighth Circuit panel and reinstate the district court’s reading and
accompanying decision to dismiss.
And even if we were to ignore all of the above, i.e., even if
First Amendment protections were to somehow apply to that
“ambiguous” clause, or even to anti-BDS laws generally, the
146. Id. at 17:20.
147. Id. at 17:34.
148. Id. at 18:26. In his rebuttal, Brian Hauss, the attorney for the ACLU, picked up
on this argument to try and make the claim that even if the people signing it knew what the
term boycott meant, the fact that someone else reading their certification might also
misunderstand and miss the definition, should be enough to turn the certification form itself,
a mere statement of fact, into a compelled ideological expression. Id. at 38:48. That
argument has no limiting principle and, thankfully, did not appear to gain any traction at all,
even from the judges sympathetic to his cause.
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court should still uphold the law as constitutional. Under the
standard free speech balancing test appropriate in this context, a
state is certainly at liberty to decide not to fund a discriminatory
movement that is antithetical to American foreign policy and to
the state’s own interest in the efficient conduct of its business,
especially if that discriminatory movement is not clearly directed
at public concerns and has the potential to undermine the
government’s relationship with the community.
At worst, based on Judge Kelly’s questions, the State will
have to go back to the district court for further proceedings
pursuant to the Eighth Circuit’s original decision and may have
to amend subsection (3) of its definition section to further clarify
that the words “other actions,” like the two subsections before it,
are only dealing with non-expressive commercial activity.149
There is no loss there, however, because that is all Arkansas ever
wanted to do all along!
And that is why legislatures in all the other states that have
passed anti-BDS bills do not have to be concerned that their laws
will be called into question by the Eighth Circuit’s ruling in this
case. Because despite what they may have heard, Arkansas Act
710 was actually substantially upheld and will be once again.

149. The legislature may even decide to amend the certification form itself, if we take
the hypothetical misinformed, lay person argument seriously.

